ENHANCING PUBLIC SAFETY WHILE SAVING PUBLIC DOLLARS WITH AUXILIARY PRIVATE SECURITY AGENTS

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HIGHLIGHTS

The core mission of policing is to control crime. However, the demands on officers in non-criminal areas have grown as governments have saddled officers with increasing responsibilities. To make the best use of scarce police time and public resources while also offering the highest level of public safety, we propose the incorporation of auxiliary private security agents in non-core areas such as administration and other ancillary tasks. By concentrating more of officers’ time on the specialized tasks which presumably led them to become officers in the first place, their job satisfaction will also likely increase, which itself will increase public safety.

Chapter 1 – The Core and Non-Core Competencies of Police Work

- Core policing functions typically involve responding to emergencies, ensuring public safety, investigating criminal activity, and enforcing the law. It is these functions for which police officers receive specialized training to successfully develop their cognitive, physical, emotional, interpersonal, and social skills.

- Research shows that officers are spending increasing amounts of time on tasks that do not utilize these specialized skillsets. In fact, studies have shown officers to spend a vast majority of their time—approximately 82% to 90%—on incidents not directly related to crime.

- Such “time sinks” do not necessarily require expert skills, a high level of physical fitness, fine-tuned emotional or interpersonal skills, or the full powers of arrest.

- For instance, a striking amount of an officer’s day is spent on administrative tasks and report writing, which absorb anywhere from 21% to 50% of a police officer’s total time.

- It is in such time-consuming areas that private agents can specialize to relieve the demands on police officers’ time, resulting in higher efficiency and productivity, and ultimately an enhanced quality of policing.

- Areas such as administration, traffic control, and the operation of sobriety checkpoints are all prime examples of tasks that can be offloaded to private agents. This will lead to considerable cost savings (compared to having police officers perform them), and a likely boost in policing efficiency due to increased job satisfaction for officers.

Chapter 2 – Cost Savings Through Delegation of Non-Core Tasks to Auxiliary Private Security Agents

- Fully 89% of officers surveyed in 2021 (and 85% of police chiefs and command staff) reported that administrative requirements limit the time they are able to spend in the community. This means less policing—both proactive (crime prevention) and reactive (responding to calls and undertaking investigations).

- We estimate annual savings of nearly $35.3 million for the Miami-Dade PD, almost $22 million for the Milwaukee PD, and over $177.4 million for the LAPD, if only 75% of the administrative burden were offloaded to private agents.

- Recent estimates show that traffic control or minor traffic incidents absorb 13% to 19% of an officer’s time, depending on the jurisdiction. Typically, these sorts of responses do not require the attention of a police officer.

- Offloading 75% of traffic management duties to trained private agents has the potential to save an enormous amount of time and money for police departments: $17.4 million for the MDPD, almost $11 million for the MPD, and $87.7 million for the LAPD.

- While there is a need for sworn officers with the power of arrest at sobriety checkpoints, there are also tasks that need not be carried out by such officers, such as conducting initial screenings, operating breathalyzers, and managing traffic.

- By divesting 75% of sobriety checkpoint labor to private agents, we estimate that the MDPD could save nearly $374,000 and the LAPD nearly $571,000 per year—annual savings of 38.9% and 42.8%, respectively.
• Both the United Kingdom and the United States have experience shifting non-core policing tasks to private agents which suggests that there are real efficiencies that can be achieved, with potentially significant benefits in terms of enhanced public safety and cost savings.

• The Lincolnshire Police signed a 10-year contract with a private security company in 2012 and were able to save £18 million in the first three years of the contract ($27.5 million in 2015, or $34.4 million today) by outsourcing administrative duties and several minor tasks. As costs fell and police officers could dedicate more time to their core tasks, so too did the crime rate fall, by 14% in the first year.

Chapter 3 – Practicality and Feasibility – Phase-In Options

• For at least a decade, police departments have been facing increased resignations, decreased applicants, and an impending “retirement bubble,” and the number of resignations has increased significantly over the past two years—in some of the country’s largest police forces, retirement rates are up nearly 30% and hiring has fallen 5%.

• The time is thus optimal to consider a gradual phasing in of supplemental auxiliary private security agents. By slowly integrating private agents, a more harmonious division of labor can be achieved while also capitalizing on the current workforce crisis in the United States with regard to police officers.

• A slow integration of private agents over a 15-year period is possible, whereby the composition of staffing changes while total personnel levels remain constant with 2020 staffing levels, thereby focusing on maximizing the benefit to taxpayers.

• By year 15, this gradual phasing-in of auxiliary private security agents generates an annual savings of nearly $180 million for the LAPD, $35 million for the MDPD, and $22 million for the MPD, while maintaining the same level of policing.

• Alternatively, if reducing the costs associated with the provision of this public service is not one of the primary goals, it is possible to maximize the total number of professionals who can be deployed while keeping budgets at the same level.

• In this case, over a 15-year period, our model estimates that the number of personnel associated with the LAPD increases by 30.2% through the hybridized addition of police and private agents, while keeping costs stable.

The proposal in this paper, far from being unrealistic or fanciful, accurately reflects and appropriately responds to the realities on the ground for policing in the United States. Every hour police spend on non-core activities is an hour less that can be spent actually controlling and preventing crime. Outsourcing non-core tasks to private agents will make our communities safer, preserve public resources, and increase officers’ job satisfaction.
INTRODUCTION

In recent years, police have been under pressure from all sides. Complaints of excessive force have mounted, especially since the death of George Floyd in 2020. The criticism has sparked calls for reform which have left many officers feeling that they are under fire, and retirements are on the rise. The current President of the United States has made it clear that crime prevention will include increased spending on policing, not a de-funding or cutting of budgets. Yet recent calls to “defund the police” by shifting funding to social services have drawn particular attention to the ever-expanding role of police officers.

The core mission of policing is to control crime. However, the demands on officers in non-criminal areas have grown as governments have saddled officers with increasing responsibilities divorced from this core mission. In fact, studies across the United States show that activities related to crime control or investigation account for only 10% to 18% of an officer’s time. When it comes to violent crime, this number is even lower, with recent data from a number of major American cities indicating that the share of a police officer’s total time on duty dedicated to preventing or controlling violent crime is only about 4%.

This expanding role has resulted in a growing mismatch between officers trained to handle core policing services (such as those related to emergency response, criminal investigations, and enforcing laws) and those non-core services that would be better handled by other professionals. For example, dealing with social issues such as homelessness, mental health, and addictions has required officers to become de facto nurses and social workers. In 1970, patrol officers spent approximately 14% of their time on calls related to mental illness and other social services. By 2020, it was estimated that fully 20% of police calls now involve a mental health or substance use crisis.

Moreover, not only are officers generally spending more time engaged with responsibilities more akin to social services, but they are also spending increasing amounts of time on certain non-core

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4. In Cincinnati, Ohio, between April 1997 and April 1998, community-oriented and beat officers spent only 10% of their time dealing directly with crime. Another study was conducted in the patrol division of a police force (which accounted for 43% of officers and 41% of the police budget) over a 54-week period in the United States. Crimes against persons consumed 2.96% of patrol officer’s time and crimes against property 14.82%. It is important to note that data are collected and reported differently depending on the jurisdiction and definitions of crime applied. Brad W. Smith, Kenneth J. Novak, and James Frank, “Community Policing and the Work Routines of Street-Level Officers,” Criminal Justice Review, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2001, p. 26. John A. Webster, “Police Task and Time Study,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 61, No. 1, 1970, p. 95.
5. This value is based on recent data for New Orleans, LA, Montgomery County, MD, and Sacramento, CA. It is important to note that data are collected and reported differently depending on the jurisdiction and definitions of crime applied. Jeff Asher and Ben Horwitz, “How Do Police Actually Spend Their Time?” The New York Times, June 19, 2020.
8. This study was conducted in a mid-size police department’s patrol division, and social service calls were defined as those that did not meet the criteria of crimes against persons or property, or patrolmen-initiated activity, traffic, or administration. These include family crisis, incidents involving drunkenness, suicide, and mental illness, ambulance service, and public nuisances, etc. These absorbed 13.7% of an officer’s time. John A. Webster, “Police Task and Time Study,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 61, No. 1, 1970, pp. 95 and 99.
9. Comparing the 14% and 20% in this paragraph is a little like comparing apples to oranges, but what it does highlight is that while a 6% increase in volume dedication is striking in and of itself, it would indeed be much higher than this if one were to include all of the calls related to family crisis, incidents involving drunkenness, suicide, and mental illness, ambulance service, and public nuisances, etc., that are included in the estimate from 1970. Eric Westervelt, “Mental Health and Police Violence: How Crisis Intervention Teams Are Failing,” NPR, September 18, 2020.
administrative functions, such as report-writing.\textsuperscript{10} The diversion of police time to non-core tasks means officers are less able to focus directly on public safety, further reducing productivity and efficiency.

This is where the economic principles of division of labor and specialization come in. In the Wealth of Nations (1776), Adam Smith—considered the founding father of economics as a science—attributes the greatest improvement of productivity to the division of labor.\textsuperscript{11} By breaking production into a number of smaller tasks, efficiency can be improved through specialization. By doing more of a single task, productivity increases and work is simplified.\textsuperscript{12} These principles have been tested empirically time and time again, demonstrating that a higher degree of specialization leads to higher productivity.\textsuperscript{13}

In the context of policing, refocusing on core tasks inherently involves a finer division of labor. The core competencies of police officers make them specialized, and adding layers of non-core tasks on top of these undoubtedly leads to efficiency loss. The person apprehending and arresting a violent offender does not need to be the same person that logs hours of routine interactions with the public or drafts reports relating to arrest statistics. Offloading these non-core tasks fosters efficiency.

Simply increasing spending on police does not address these inefficiencies, and historically, more police spending in the United States has not correlated with lower crime rates.\textsuperscript{14} Thus, to make the best use of scarce police time and public resources while also offering the highest level of public safety, deeper and broader reforms are necessary. To address the growing mismatch between what police actually do and where their added value for society is, we propose the incorporation of auxiliary private security agents (hereafter referred to as “private agents”) in non-core areas, such as administration and other ancillary tasks.\textsuperscript{15}

These trained non-officer professionals, lacking the police powers of arrest, will serve as “force multipliers” who, through the division of labor, will enhance the reach and effectiveness of existing police resources. By offloading non-core tasks to these private agents, both groups will be able to specialize and the productivity and efficiency of police forces will improve, as empirically, a higher degree of specialization leads to higher productivity.\textsuperscript{16} In addition, by concentrating more of officers’ time on the specialized and demanding tasks for which they were trained and which presumably led them to become officers in the first place, their job satisfaction will likely increase. The use of private agents may therefore also be important in addressing problems of officer recruitment and retention.\textsuperscript{17} And because the acid test of any policing reform must be its effects on public safety, we also posit, with real-life examples to support this contention, that employing trained private agents to take on non-core policing tasks will help to drive down the crime rate as police focus on their core policing function.

To address the growing mismatch between what police actually do and where their added value for society is, we propose the incorporation of auxiliary private security agents.

Using three of the largest police departments in the United States—the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), the Miami-Dade Police Department (MDPD), and the Milwaukee Police

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\textsuperscript{12} Caroline Ntara, “What is Division of Labor?” October 2, 2021.

\textsuperscript{13} Guido Friebel and Levent Yilmaz, “Flexibility, specialization and individual productivity: Evidence from Call Center data,” Available from SSRN, September 2012, pp. 9-12.

\textsuperscript{14} Philip Bump, “Over the past 60 years, more spending on police hasn’t necessarily meant less crime,” The Washington Post, June 7, 2020.

\textsuperscript{15} Note that by auxiliary private security agents, we are not referring to personnel who operate in malls (“mall cops”) or who are intended to be restricted to gated communities. Rather, these agents will be incorporated in police forces such that they operate like paralegals with respect to lawyers, in a symbiotic relationship for the benefit of all residents in the areas where the police department operates.

\textsuperscript{16} Guido Friebel and Levent Yilmaz, op. cit, footnote 13.

Department (MPD)—as case studies, this research paper explores how the supplementation of policing with private security agents can enhance public safety, improve officer morale and retention, and reduce the pressure on public funds.

To set the stage, a description of policing in the United States is provided in the first chapter, including core and non-core police tasks. This is useful in understanding how specialization can improve police efficiency.

The second chapter introduces the idea of private agents as force multipliers, and how the roles and responsibilities of these agents can serve to amplify the response of the police through specialization. Through a number of distinct scenarios, we highlight how the division of labor can effectively reduce the cost of public services. Furthermore, in the final section of this chapter, we discuss how reforms of this type have been structured in a number of jurisdictions, with results ranging from reduced public spending to increased job satisfaction for police officers to enhanced public safety.

Finally, in the third chapter, we discuss the feasibility of supplementing police forces with private agents, and some considerations in doing so, through two measured simulations. First, we show how police departments can relieve some of the public cost burden over time while keeping the number of professionals stable. Alternatively, we show how we can maximize number of professionals while keeping costs stable.

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18. By number of officers, in 2020, the LAPD was the third largest in the US with 9,870 officers, the MDPD is eighth largest with 2,723 officers, and the MPD is twentieth largest with 1,879 officers. A more thorough description of each department is presented in Appendix A. Ellen Kershner, "The Largest Police Departments in the US," World Atlas, August 3, 2020.

19. The culture of policing and the educational and training requirements of officers are further discussed and detailed in Appendix A.

20. The educational and training requirements for private security agents are detailed in Appendix B.
Enhancing Public Safety While Saving Public Dollars with Auxiliary Private Security Agents
CHAPTER 1

The Core and Non-Core Competencies of Police Work

There are more than 18,000 distinct law enforcement agencies in the United States\(^2\) and approximately 718,000 individuals with the power of arrest employed full-time at the local, county, state, and federal levels, and by departments in colleges and schools and other specialized jurisdictions.\(^2\) As departments range from small-town police departments that employ a half-dozen officers to the 36,000 officers of the NYPD,\(^2\) policing is highly decentralized and legal and geographic jurisdictions vary.\(^2\)

The size and composition of police departments have changed dramatically over time, alongside societal changes and the push for diversification.\(^2\) Over the past half century, the role of a police officer has expanded considerably;\(^2\) however, the core competencies needed to deal with crime and ensure public safety have not. Being a police officer has thus never been more demanding, which is why it is imperative that law enforcement agencies hire, train, and retain the most skilled officers,\(^3\) while also ensuring that resources are employed in the most efficient manner possible. This also means making sure that the tasks conducted by police make use of the skills and competencies for which they have trained and which are necessary for successful crime fighting. This chapter describes the competencies required of police officers, as well as some of the tasks that may be better suited to a properly trained auxiliary private security agent (hereafter referred to as a “private agent”).\(^2\)

The Core Skills Necessary for Successful Policing

Core policing functions typically involve responding to emergencies, ensuring public safety, investigating criminal activity, and enforcing the law.\(^4\) It is these functions for which police officers receive specialized training to successfully develop a combination of cognitive, physical, emotional, interpersonal, and social skills.\(^5\) Of course the general concept of “keeping the peace” is also considered a core function, although this is somewhat problematic because of how vast and ill-defined that role is.

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4.  Brian A. Reaves, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies; Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2008; Matthew Hickman and Tracey Kyckelhahn, National Sources of Law Enforcement Data, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs.


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28. For a more robust analysis of the tactics and policies that inform police conduct and how they are educated and trained, please see Appendix A.


30. Daniel M. Blumberg et al., op. cit., footnote 27.

to regulations and policy. Skills related to adaptability are needed in order for officers to remain nimble and manage competing demands. Thus, the cognitive skills required of a police officer necessitate high mental flexibility.

Physical skills

Police work also requires significant physical skills. While research shows that police work is becoming increasingly sedentary (likely due, in part, to the increased administrative burdens discussed below), physical skills remain necessary for an officer’s security. Police must still have the ability to accomplish tasks with high physical demands, not least of which is the apprehension of dangerous criminals and the prevention of crimes in progress.

Emotional skills

Emotional skills are also incredibly important for the successful management of the interpersonal challenges of policing. These skills relate to emotional regulation and stress tolerance, as well as general emotional intelligence. Emotional regulation is linked with rational behavior and ability to perform accurate risk and benefit analyses, and research has demonstrated that “emotions powerfully, predictably, and pervasively influence decision making.” Research also shows that officers with high levels of emotional skills, specifically emotional intelligence, tend to handle stress better than those with lower levels, and this positively correlates with improved police performance. In addition, emotional skills are linked to frequency of use-of-force incidents in many studies, which is increasingly important given today’s discourse on excessive force.

Interpersonal skills

Closely related to the above competencies are interpersonal skills. The work of a police officer requires interactions with a wide range of citizens and situations that call upon both verbal and non-verbal communication skills. As a result, effective policing requires an understanding of what is communicated consciously, and subconsciously, by each participant in an encounter, including officers themselves.

Research shows that officers are spending increasing amounts of time on tasks that do not utilize these specialized skillsets.

These interpersonal skills are especially important in the increasing number of encounters with persons who are either neurodivergent or undergoing a mental health crisis. In those situations, rote employment of the various rungs of the “use of force” matrix to control a situation may actually be counterproductive and create the need to use force unnecessarily. Having the interpersonal intelligence to understand when time, distance, and cover can be more effective than assertion of control is a crucial policing skill.

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33. S.W. Spilberg and D.M. Corey, op. cit., footnote 31.


42. Ibid, p. 25.

Finally, police work requires a combination of essential social skills such as social competence, teamwork, relationship-building, and the ability to take control of situations assertively and persuasively.44

Non-Core Tasks Are Time Sinks

While the cognitive, physical, emotional, interpersonal, and social skills related to emergency response or crime prevention are key for core police tasks, research shows that officers are spending increasing amounts of time on tasks that do not utilize these specialized skillsets. In fact, studies have shown officers to spend a vast majority of their time—approximately 82% to 90%—on incidents

44. Daniel M. Blumberg et al., op. cit., footnote 27, p. 8.
not directly related to crime. These tasks are “time sinks,” as they often consume a significant amount of an officer’s time. In the context of the limited resource that is on-duty policing time, these tasks fall into one of the following four categories:

1. Tasks that rely on specialized equipment but do not require expert skills, such as performing security clearances or fingerprinting;
2. Tasks that do not require a high level of physical fitness or specialized training, such as escorting a funeral or guard duty;
3. Tasks that require concentrated training but not necessarily physical prowess or fine-tuned emotional or interpersonal skills, such as dispatching police vehicles; and
4. Tasks that do not require full powers of arrest, such as administering breathalyzers (see Figure 1-1).

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45. In Cincinnati, Ohio, between April 1997 and April 1998, community-oriented and beat officers spent only 10% of their time dealing directly with crime. Another study was conducted in the patrol division of a police force (which accounted for 43% of officers and 41% of the police budget) over a 56-week period in the United States. Crimes against persons consumed 2.96% of a patrol officer’s time and crimes against property 14.82%. It is important to note that data are collected and reported differently depending on the jurisdiction and definitions of crime applied. Brad W. Smith, Kenneth J. Novak, and James Frank, “Community Policing and the Work Routines of Street-Level Officers,” Criminal Justice Review, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2001, p. 26; John A. Webster, “Police Task and Time Study,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 61, No. 1, 1970, p. 95.

Over time, non-core demands are consuming greater shares of officer time. Depending on the jurisdiction, officers spend between 50% and 125% more time dealing with medical and other issues than they spend dealing with violent crime, and 700% to 825% more time responding to non-criminal calls47 (see Figure 1-2).

In another study, only about 3% of an officer’s time was considered to have been spent responding to or preventing violent crimes,48 compared to nearly 14% dealing with social service calls.49 More striking still is the amount of time spent on administrative tasks and report writing, which absorb anywhere from 21% to 50% of a police officer’s total time50 (see Figure 1-3).

It is in fact precisely in these time-consuming areas that private agents can specialize to relieve the demands on police officers’ time, resulting in higher efficiency, productivity, and quality of policing.

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47. Percentage difference for medical and other and violent crime taken between 4% and 6% for New Orleans, 4% and 8% for Montgomery County, and 4% and 9% for Sacramento. For the difference between violent crime and non-criminal matters, the percentage difference was calculated between 4% and 37% for both New Orleans and Montgomery County and 4% and 32% for Sacramento. Jeff Asher and Ben Horwitz, “How Do Police Actually Spend Their Time?” The New York Times, June 19, 2020.

48. In this study, crimes against persons consumed 2.96% of a patrol officer’s time, and include crimes which would be considered violent crimes: criminal homicide, rape, kidnapping, battery, robbery, assault with intent to commit murder, etc. John A. Webster, ibid., footnote 45.

49. In this study, social service calls were defined as those that did not meet the criteria of crimes against persons or property, or patrolmen-initiated activity, traffic, or administration. These include family crisis, incidents involving drunkenness, suicide, and mental illness, ambulance service, and public nuisances, etc. These absorbed 13.7% of an officer’s time. John A. Webster, ibid., pp. 95 and 99.

the demands on police officers’ time, resulting in higher efficiency, productivity, and quality of policing. When these tasks are taken up by private agents, these personnel enhance the reach, effectiveness, and probability of success for the police department as a whole through better specialization and division of labor. As these agents already exercise their profession with certain minimum standards to ensure the quality of their work, augmenting training standards further can encompass many of the task areas useful to police and align with the needs of the force. This would allow for specialization in these task areas, and through cooperation with police, allow these private agents to exploit the niche that corresponds to these non-core tasks.

This division of labor brings a reduction in the taxpayer burden, and a likely boost in efficiency due to increased job satisfaction for police officers.

Areas such as administration, traffic control, and the operation of sobriety checkpoints are all prime examples of tasks that fall into one or more of the categories discussed above. As we will see in the next chapter, offloading these tasks to private agents will lead to considerable cost savings compared to having police officers perform them. Thus, this division of labor brings a reduction in the taxpayer burden, and a likely boost in efficiency due to increased job satisfaction for police officers.

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51. This is an amended definition from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations,” Joint Publication 3-05.1, April 26, 2007, p. 394.

52. The full scope of duties, and education and training requirements, is explored in Appendix B.
CHAPTER 2
Cost Savings Through Delegation of Non-Core Tasks to Auxiliary Private Security Agents

Policing accounts for one aspect of public funding related to law and order in the United States, stemming from all levels of government. As policing does not come with a user-fee, cost-effectiveness is not maintained through the discipline of the market, nor are detailed breakdowns of the costs of providing policing readily available.  

For example, in 2020, the MDPD had a strength of 2,988 sworn officers with an average yearly compensation (including salary and benefits) of $100,136, while the 1,728 officers in the MPD each cost $105,492 annually, and the LAPD’s 9,833 officers netted an average of $138,726 annually. However, the amounts that are spent on core vs. non-core tasks are much less clear.

The four categories of non-core police “time sinks” discussed in Chapter 1 encompass a wide range of tasks which do not necessarily require expert skills, a high level of physical fitness, fine-tuned emotional or interpersonal skills, or the full powers of arrest. These include of course the heavy administrative load borne by officers, as well as other auxiliary duties such as those related to traffic management and sobriety checkpoints. So, while official data does not exist on how much is spent precisely on such time sinks, we can nevertheless calculate the costs of specific tasks and the anticipated relief for the public purse to be had by outsourcing them to auxiliary private security agents (hereafter referred to as “private agents”).

2.1 Cost Savings Generated by Delegating Non-Core Administrative Tasks

Paperwork and other administrative duties do not require the skills of a sworn officer and can easily be accomplished by a contractor following guidelines and trained in proper technique. Some of these administrative tasks may include (but are not limited to) collecting and collating data for required state and federal reporting, conducting follow-up interviews with witnesses and victims of low-level or property crime, tracking and tagging evidence, performing escort duty, preparing affidavits for warrants, and preparing necessary reporting for courts and probation offices (see Figure 2-1).

A 2021 national survey of police departments across the country revealed that 38% of police officers spend 2-4 hours per shift (about 25% to 50% of their time) on paperwork, and another 16% spend more than 4 hours a day on paperwork. According to 67% of police chiefs and command staff surveyed, the documentation burden had increased over the past year due to regulations and federal mandates.

60. The 2021 Role of Technology in Law Enforcement Paperwork Survey was deployed to more than 8,000 police chiefs and their command staff, including patrol officers, detectives, sergeants, lieutenants and those responsible for IT and Records Management Systems (RMS). Nuance Communications, Inc., “Dragon Professional Cloud 2021 Role of Technology in Law Enforcement Paperwork annual report,” October 1st, 2021, p. 3.
61. Ibid.
Reducing this burden on officers is important, as it affects almost the entire police force. Fully 89% of officers surveyed in 2021 reported that administrative requirements limit the time they are able to spend in the community. Moreover, 85% of police chiefs and command staff agreed that onerous administrative tasks result in officers spending less time in the community. Less time in the community means less policing—both proactive (crime prevention) and reactive (responding to calls and undertaking investigations). For instance, in Milwaukee, officers have been quoted warning that Milwaukee’s crime statistics would rise, as “[i]t is hard to fight crime with so much red tape and oversight.” In addition, “[t]he excessive documentation, and punitive measures if the documentation isn’t carried out, will deter cops from conducting field interviews and traffic stops.”

Based on these figures and the staffing compositions of the three departments, we estimate that in 2020, the MDPD spent 7,858 hours, the MPD 4,571 hours, and the LAPD 25,861 hours of police time, per shift, on administration. When we scale this annually, we see that the MDPD spends an average of 1,886,026 hours on administration, the MPD 1,097,026, and the LAPD 6,206,590.

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**Figure 2-1**

**Examples of administrative tasks that can be offloaded to auxiliary private security agents**

- Collecting and collating data for required state and federal reporting
- Escort duty
- Preparing affidavits for warrants
- Preparing necessary reporting for courts and probation offices
- Administrative tasks that can be transferred from sworn officers to auxiliary private security agents
- Follow-up interviews with witnesses and victims of low-level or property crime
- Tracking and tagging evidence
- Escort duty

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62. Ibid., p. 4.
63. Ibid., p. 3.
65. Authors’ calculations. For those that spent 2-4 hours we assumed an average of 3 hours. For those who spent more than 4 hours we assumed an average of 5 hours. For the remaining 46% of police officers, we assumed a conservative estimate of 1.5 hours. Nuance Communications, Inc., op. cit., footnote 60, p. 3.
66. Authors’ calculations. We assume four weeks’ vacation and an average of 5 shifts per week per full time officer. Thus, we assume each officer works an average of 240 shifts per year.
Therefore, these police departments are spending heavily on administrative duties. In fact, we estimate that every year, in administrative costs alone, the MDPD spends $90.8 million, the MPD over $55.6 million, and the LAPD nearly $414 million.67 Furthermore, these values represent 12%, 19%, and 13% of the approved operating budgets of the MDPD, MPD, and LAPD, respectively68 (see Figure 2-2).

As the average yearly salary (including benefits) of a private agent is much lower than that of a police officer,69 there is a significant opportunity for savings of public funds, which could follow a public call for competitive tendering.

In fact, even with an assumed contractor margin of 20%, we estimate annual savings of more than $47 million for the MDPD, $29.3 million for the MPD, and $177.4 million for the LAPD.

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67. Authors’ calculations. This is not taking into consideration the administrative costs for non-sworn officers.


69. Using publicly available data for security agents in each of the three jurisdictions.
MPD, and over $236.6 million for the LAPD, if the entire administrative burden was offloaded to private agents. However, some tasks may require a police officer’s involvement at some point in the administrative process, such as for review, report sign off, or to ensure rigor. With a more conservative estimate of 75% of the total administrative load offloaded to supplemental private agents (and the remaining 25% carried out by officers), we anticipate annual savings of nearly $35.3 million for the MDPD, almost $22 million for the MPD, and over $177.4 million for the LAPD (see Table 2-1).

Impacted by both judicial decisions and technological innovations, the administrative burden has evolved across the United States in response to ever-changing social norms, expectations, and political direction. Requirements vary from department to department, often as a result of particular policy choices or legal requirements. For instance, a recent judicial decision in Milwaukee requires officers to log each and every public interaction in a database, regardless of whether it results in an arrest or even questioning. These arduous reporting requirements have impacted the morale and job satisfaction of some officers in Milwaukee, which has the potential to decrease the quality of policing and negatively impact public safety.

### 2.2 Cost Savings Generated by Delegating Traffic Control

Recent estimates show that traffic control or minor traffic incidents absorb 13% to 19% of an officer’s time, depending on the jurisdiction. Typically, these sorts of responses do not require the attention of a police officer, and outsourcing traffic incidents will not only free up a considerable amount of officers’ time, but has the potential to reduce incidents of violence, especially against people of color. Studies show that police disproportionately stop people of color and subject them to additional intrusive police behavior, like searches. Traffic incidents were also responsible for approximately 10% of the total number of people killed by police in 2021.

Offloading all or a significant portion of traffic management duties to trained private agents has the potential to save an enormous amount of time and money for police departments. As indicated in Table 2-2, below, the police departments selected stand to save, at minimum, between 39% and 43% of the total amount of money spent on traffic control in a year, based on 2020 figures, and possibly more.

Some municipalities across the country are already investigating the feasibility of offloading this component of policing. In July 2020, Berkeley, California voted in favor of removing police from traffic stops as part of their police reform. While Berkeley’s pilot program would see the creation of a city department of transportation with unarmed public officials, there’s no reason the same reform couldn’t be enacted with private security contractors. Cambridge, Massachusetts is also

70. Authors’ calculations.
71. Authors’ calculations.
74. Ryan Meyer, op. cit., footnote 64.
78. One hundred and seventeen people were killed after being stopped for a traffic violation. A total of 1,136 people were killed by police in 2021. Mapping Police Violence, 2021 Police Violence Report, consulted May 30, 2021.
79. Authors’ calculations, based on the initial cost calculation. The MDPD will save 39%, the MPD will save 40%, and the LAPD will save 43% in the conservative 75% offload scenario. If offloading 100%, the MDPD will save 52%, the MPD will save 53%, and the LAPD 57%. This is based on officers spending 15% of their time on traffic control.
Table 2-1

Substantial savings for police departments from outsourcing administrative burden borne by police officers to auxiliary private security agents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Miami-Dade (MDPD)</th>
<th>Milwaukee (MPD)</th>
<th>Los Angeles (LAPD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>POLICE OFFICERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours annually spent on administration</td>
<td>1,886,025.60</td>
<td>1,097,025.60</td>
<td>6,206,589.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average hourly wage (including benefits)</td>
<td>$48.14</td>
<td>$50.72</td>
<td>$66.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual salary (including benefits)</td>
<td>$100,136.13</td>
<td>$105,503.59</td>
<td>$138,736.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual total cost of administrative work</td>
<td>$90,797,741.77</td>
<td>$55,644,295.08</td>
<td>$413,979,957.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual budget (2020)</td>
<td>$764,598,000.00</td>
<td>$297,366,419.00</td>
<td>$3,140,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of annual budget spent on administrative duties</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AUXILIARY PRIVATE SECURITY AGENTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average hourly wage (including benefits)</td>
<td>$19.33</td>
<td>$19.99</td>
<td>$23.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual salary (including benefits)</td>
<td>$40,196.84</td>
<td>$41,589.34</td>
<td>$49,528.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SCENARIO 1: 100% OF ADMINISTRATIVE LOAD</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cost (including benefits)* to offload all administrative work to auxiliary private security agents</td>
<td>$43,737,845.75</td>
<td>$26,321,870.12</td>
<td>$177,348,613.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential annual savings for the offloading of the administrative load to auxiliary private security agents</td>
<td>$47,059,896.02</td>
<td>$29,322,424.96</td>
<td>$236,631,343.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent saved – 100% offload</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SCENARIO 2: 75% OF ADMINISTRATIVE LOAD</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total in salary (including benefits)* for security to take over 75% of the administrative burden</td>
<td>$32,803,384.31</td>
<td>$19,741,402.59</td>
<td>$133,011,460.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cost in salary (including benefits) for police for 25% administration</td>
<td>$22,699,435.44</td>
<td>$13,911,073.77</td>
<td>$103,494,989.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cost of administrative load with 75% uptake</td>
<td>$55,502,819.76</td>
<td>$33,652,476.36</td>
<td>$236,506,449.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential annual savings for the offloading of 75% of the administrative load to auxiliary private security agents</td>
<td>$35,294,922.02</td>
<td>$21,991,818.72</td>
<td>$177,473,507.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent saved – 75% offload</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Including an assumed contractor margin of 20%

### Table 2-2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Miami-Dade (MDPD)</th>
<th>Milwaukee (MPD)</th>
<th>Los Angeles (LAPD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>POLICE OFFICERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of hours annually spent on traffic related incidents*</td>
<td>932,256</td>
<td>542,256</td>
<td>3,067,896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average hourly police wage (including benefits)</td>
<td>$48.14</td>
<td>$50.72</td>
<td>$66.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual total cost of traffic</td>
<td>$44,881,013.04</td>
<td>$27,504,784.64</td>
<td>$204,628,876.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual budget (2020)</td>
<td>$764,598,000.00</td>
<td>$297,366,419.00</td>
<td>$3,140,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of annual budget spending</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AUXILIARY PRIVATE SECURITY AGENTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average hourly wage (including benefits) for auxiliary private security agents</td>
<td>$19.33</td>
<td>$19.99</td>
<td>$23.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SCENARIO 1: 100% TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cost for 100% traffic takeover**</td>
<td>$21,619,467.48</td>
<td>$13,010,810.33</td>
<td>$87,662,812.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential annual savings with 100% offload</td>
<td>$23,261,545.56</td>
<td>$14,493,974.31</td>
<td>$116,966,063.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of annual budget spending with 100% offload</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SCENARIO 2: 75% TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total security cost for 75% traffic takeover**</td>
<td>$16,214,600.61</td>
<td>$9,758,107.74</td>
<td>$65,747,109.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Include 25% police</td>
<td>$11,220,253.26</td>
<td>$6,876,196.16</td>
<td>$51,157,219.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cost for 75% offload</td>
<td>$27,434,853.87</td>
<td>16,634,303.90</td>
<td>$116,904,328.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential annual savings for the offloading of 75% of traffic control to auxiliary private security agents</td>
<td>$17,446,159.17</td>
<td>$10,870,480.74</td>
<td>$87,724,547.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of annual budget spending with 75% offload</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Assuming that 15% of an officer’s time is spent on traffic control or minor traffic incidents
** Including an assumed contractor margin of 20%

considering reassigning traffic enforcement from police to unarmed municipal employees in other departments, and Montgomery County, Maryland has commissioned a study to determine the feasibility of doing the same.

2.3 Cost Savings Generated by Delegating Sobriety Checkpoints

In addition to administrative tasks and traffic control, there are other tasks that can easily be shifted to a properly trained private agent. Consider sobriety checkpoints, which are intended to deter impaired driving. These short-term operations generally involve as many as 15 to 20 officers. While there is a need for sworn officers with the power of arrest at these checkpoints, there are also tasks that need not be carried out by such officers, such as conducting initial screenings, operating breathalyzers, and managing traffic. Reducing the number of officers present and supplementing with security personnel can reduce the costs associated with these checkpoints, both in terms of police resources and in terms of dollars. By offloading these non-core tasks that do not require the power of arrest, the capacity of officers to respond to criminal impaired driving is expanded.

**While there is a need for sworn officers with the power of arrest at these checkpoints, there are also tasks that need not be carried out by such officers.**

Research shows that each checkpoint requires at least 6 hours of police time per officer. Assuming a level of 16 officers and 208 individual sobriety checkpoints per year, this amounts to a cost of over $961,000 a year for the MDPD and over $1.3 million for the LAPD. Research in smaller rural communities has indicated that low-staffed checkpoints are also effective, therefore divesting 75% of the labor to auxiliary private agents and maintaining a complement of 4 officers (25%) is unlikely to reduce the efficiency of the checkpoint or public safety. In doing so, the MDPD could save nearly $374,000 and the LAPD nearly $571,000 per year—annual savings of 38.9% and 42.8%, respectively, compared with the amounts spent in 2020 under the status quo (see Table 2-3). At current salary and benefit rates, these savings equate to the annual salary for about 4 officers in either jurisdiction. (As sobriety checkpoints are illegal under Wisconsin law the economic case for the Milwaukee Police Department was not modelled.)

2.4 In Practice: Experiences from the UK and US

Shifting non-core policing tasks to private agents, while uncommon, is not unprecedented. Localities in both the United Kingdom and the United States have experience with new policing models that utilize these personnel. While limited in scope, these experiments suggest that there are real efficiencies that can be achieved, with potentially significant benefits in terms of enhanced public safety and cost savings.

The UK Experience: Reduced Crime and Enhanced Public Safety

Supplementing police forces with security agents increased the quality of services provided to the community in the case of the United Kingdom.

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86. Ibid., p. 213.


88. Two checkpoints on each Friday night and Saturday night of the year. Considering the size of the jurisdictions of these PDs, this is a very conservative estimate.

89. Authors’ calculations.

90. John H. Lacey et al., op. cit., footnote 85.

91. Authors’ calculations.

92. Authors’ calculations.

The Lincolnshire Example

The Lincolnshire Police signed a 10-year contract with a private security company in 2012 and were able to save £18 million in the first three years of the contract ($27.5 million in 2015, or $34.4 million today) by outsourcing administrative duties and several minor tasks. As costs fell and police officers could dedicate more time to their core tasks, so too did the crime rate fall, by 14% in the first year. In addition, the proportion of emergency calls answered within the target timeframe increased by 4.5%, another indicator of improved quality.

Both the United Kingdom and the United States have experience with new policing models that suggest that there are real efficiencies that can be achieved.

Table 2-3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Miami-Dade (MDPD)</th>
<th>Los Angeles (LAPD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>POLICE OFFICERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of sworn officers per checkpoint</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of hours per officer</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average hourly wage (including benefits)</td>
<td>$48.14</td>
<td>$66.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of checkpoints annually</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of checkpoints annually, status quo</td>
<td>$961,259.52</td>
<td>$1,331,865.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AUXILIARY PRIVATE SECURITY AGENTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average hourly wage (including benefits)</td>
<td>$19.33</td>
<td>$23.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUPPLEMENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of officers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of auxiliary private security agents</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of checkpoints: new scenario*</td>
<td>$587,698.18</td>
<td>$760,860.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual savings</td>
<td>$373,561.34</td>
<td>$571,004.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent saved – 75% offload</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Including an assumed contractor margin of 20%


94. Li-Mei Hoang, “Private firms could save Britain’s police 1 billion pounds a year – G4S,” Reuters, November 19, 2015.
96. The proportion of calls to 999 (the British equivalent of 911) answered within 10 seconds increased from 89% in 2011/2012 to 93%, a percentage increase of 4.5%. Elizabeth Fish, “G4S deal saved Lincolnshire Police £5 million in a year,” The Lincolite, June 24, 2013.
Enhancing Public Safety While Saving Public Dollars with Auxiliary Private Security Agents

The London Example

Also in the UK, in a number of neighborhoods in London, a police-styled security firm has been commissioned privately by businesses and residents to work alongside police or other groups to solve crimes and prevent anti-social behavior. Since its inception in 2016, there has been significant crime reduction in all areas of operation, including burglary and drug-dealing, among other offenses. After seven months patrolling one East London neighborhood, crime rates dropped an impressive 43%.

US Examples of the Use of Private Security Agents in Policing

On US home soil, there are abundant examples of the use of private agents to extend police manpower and increase public safety.

Oakland

In 2013, amidst increasing crime and reduced police manpower, the understaffed police force in Oakland, California was unable to respond to all reports of criminal activity. In reaction, a number of wealthier communities began investing in private security forces to patrol their neighborhoods, which resulted in reduced crime. This was not the first time that Oakland turned to private security to supplement an underfunded local police force: Four years earlier, the city council had approved the hiring of private security to patrol certain high-crime neighborhoods in the city’s first use of public funds to pay for private security. While Oakland paid an average of $250,000 annually to cover the salary and benefits for each public police officer, it could afford to hire four private security patrolmen for only $200,000 total each year.

Table 2-4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
<th>Fewer violent crimes</th>
<th>Fewer property crimes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LAPD</td>
<td>4,116</td>
<td>13,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDPD</td>
<td>1,867</td>
<td>11,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPD</td>
<td>1,102</td>
<td>2,114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Authors’ calculations. For LA and WI, violent crime comprises murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Property crimes comprise burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson. Based on 2019 crime statistics compiled by the FBI. For Miami-Dade, the crime statistics are compiled by the state and are for 2019. For all jurisdictions, the average of 14% crime reduction applied evenly to all crimes.


The Lincolnshire Police were able to save £18 million in three years by outsourcing administrative duties and several minor tasks.
Memphis

In Memphis, the Blue Suede Brigade was formed in the mid-1990s by the Downtown Memphis Commission to serve as hospitality ambassadors to the city, but in 2017, their role was expanded to include security duties as well. The “supplemental eyes” to law enforcement, Brigadiers make contact with and provide assistance to visitors, workers, residents, and businesses downtown through their daily patrol. This patrol is comprised of only licensed security guards, which allows them to perform a wide array of tasks with a certain level of training. Since inception, the Brigade has answered over 4,000 service calls and spent over 43,000 hours patrolling. In addition to the police department, the Brigade works closely with other social service agencies.

Chicago, San Francisco, Baltimore

Amidst widespread looting in 2020, Chicago awarded emergency no-bid contracts to a number of private security companies in a public spend of up to US$1.2 million. Assigned to patrol certain areas and protect businesses, their presence allowed the city, according to the mayor, to “free up our police personnel to be as nimble as possible in responding to district-level calls for service.” In other areas of Chicago, private patrols are the norm, hired by neighborhood associations throughout the city. Residents, businesses, and community or neighborhood associations in San Francisco and Baltimore also contract private security companies due to stretched-thin police departments. While this retention of private security has generally not been at the public level, research shows positive spillover effects that should raise the eyebrows of politicians.

Overall, as indicated in Table 2-4, there are very real positive consequences in terms of enhanced public safety. In addition, with a more streamlined division of labor between police officers and auxiliary private security agents, officer morale is likely to be boosted through increased job satisfaction. While officers join the force for a variety of reasons, research shows that the more that expectations differ from the reality of the job, the lower the employee’s job satisfaction. With the changing nature of policing and the increased amount of time spent on non-core tasks, it is highly likely that expectations differ from reality.

Finally, meta-analyses show that as employee role strain increases, employee job satisfaction decreases. Thus, officers are less satisfied with their jobs when required to perform tasks that are disliked, such as administration or other non-core tasks. When officers utilize a variety of complex skills, their job satisfaction is higher. Not only does job satisfaction matter for the officers themselves, but it can also result in higher quality policing as well as lower absenteeism and turnover.

Highlights

Since its inception in 2016, there has been significant crime reduction in all areas of operation, including burglary and drug-dealing, among other offenses.

105. During COVID disruptions, the Brigade provided services city-wide. Downtown Memphis Commission, Blue Suede Brigade, consulted June 1st, 2022; Dave Detling, “Blue Suede Brigade Relaunches with New Look and Job Responsibilities,” abc24/7, July 14, 2017.
106. While being a licensed security guard is not required to apply to the patrol, the Downtown Memphis Commission will assist non-licensed employees to acquire their license.
109. Ibid.
115. Jordan Peterson, “Predicting Job Satisfaction in a Medium Sized Texas Police Department,” Department of Political Science Texas State University-San Marcos, Spring 2013, p. 56.
Thus, this change in focus for officers is also in itself a force multiplier.

The estimates in the previous scenarios assume that the transition to the use of private agents happens instantaneously. This is, of course, an oversimplification for the sake of illustration, to show what, in theory, the total cost savings could be. In reality, the introduction of these auxiliary professionals need not be instantaneous. It could be gradual and measured, replacing some retiring officers and some of those who leave the force for other reasons. We will discuss such possibilities in Chapter 3, as well as other considerations that must be taken into account when implementing reforms of this nature.

CHAPTER 3
Practicality and Feasibility – Phase-In Options

For at least a decade, police departments have been facing increased resignations, decreased applicants, and an impending “retirement bubble,” and the situation is intensifying. In fact, the number of resignations has increased significantly over the past two years—in some of the country’s largest police forces, retirement rates are up nearly 30% and hiring has fallen 5%. As a result, several departments across the country reported a nearly 45% increase in the number of departures in 2020 compared to the year before. In this context, police departments are trying to fill positions, and fast. The time is thus optimal to consider a gradual phasing-in of supplemental auxiliary private security agents. By slowly integrating private agents, a more harmonious division of labor can be achieved while also capitalizing on the current workforce crisis in the United States with regard to police officers.

3.1 Minimizing the Public Burden to Taxpayers

A slow integration of private agents over a 15-year period is possible, whereby the composition of staffing changes while total personnel levels remain constant with 2020 staffing levels. Therefore, this first simulation does not take population (or police force) growth into account, and is focused on maximizing the benefit to taxpayers. Using the average resignation and retirement rate across the United States in 2019-2020 and a projected time period of 15 years, we have modelled this integration such that the composition of police officers never falls below 77% in any of the three jurisdictions (see Figure 3-1).

As staff composition slowly changes, so too does the reduction in public expenditures. As shown in Figure 3-2, as time passes, more budgetary relief is made possible due to the increasing proportion of private agents. By year 15, an annual savings of nearly $180 million is possible for the LAPD, $35 million for the MDPD, and $22 million for the MPD, while maintaining the same level of policing.

By slowly integrating private agents, a more harmonious division of labor can be achieved while also capitalizing on the current workforce crisis.

3.2 Maximizing the Number of Police and Private Security Professionals

As we have described throughout, the offloading of non-core tasks to private agents is expected to increase the quality of policing and therefore enhance public safety, while accumulating considerable budget reductions for police departments. But if reducing the costs associated with the provision of this public service is not one of the primary goals, the integration may look different. While historically, more police spending in the United States has not been correlated with lower crime rates, research shows that a visible presence,

120. The rate was determined through survey response, and while not necessarily a representative sample of police agencies nationwide, and based on April 1, 2020 to March 31, 2021 data, it was a mixed sample of small, medium, and large departments. There were an average 4.91 resignations per 100 officers and another 4.14 retirements per 100 officers, giving us an attrition rate of approximately 9%. It is worth noting that these values were increases of 18% and 43%, respectively, year-over-year. The Police Executive Research Forum, PERF Special Report, Changes in Hiring, Resignation, and Retirement Rates, June 11, 2021.
121. Depending on the ratio of integration. We used a more conservative replacement ratio of 30% auxiliary private security and 70% police to maintain current levels of personnel. If a more gradual or more rapid scenario were desired, the proportions would change accordingly. We also expect that as police officers are increasingly able to focus on the core tasks of the job thanks to the offloading of additional tasks and the curtailing of mission creep, their job satisfaction will increase and turnover rates should decrease. This could potentially reduce the attrition rate in subsequent years, which might slow the transition somewhat, but this is not taken into account here. Future, more sophisticated simulations should take this into consideration.
122. Authors’ calculations. This is based on 2020 staffing levels, salary, and benefits information, and utilizing a conservative estimate whereby 70% of the vacated positions are filled with new sworn officers and 30% are hired auxiliary private security agents.
Figure 3-1

The gradual phasing-in of auxiliary private security agents in Milwaukee, keeping the number of personnel constant with 2020 staffing levels and the attrition rate observed for 2020-2021

Figure 3-2

Potential yearly taxpayer burden relief (millions of $) in the LAPD, MDPD, and PD with measured integration of auxiliary private security agents over a 15-year horizon

such as patrol, does reduce crime. Research also shows that the presence of a uniformed security guard reduces crime. Therefore, if the primary goal is further crime reduction, we can instead model the scenario so to maximize the total number of professionals who can be deployed while keeping budgets at the same level.

As can be seen in Figure 3-3, over a 15-year period, the number of personnel associated with the LAPD increases by 30.2% through the hybridized addition of police and private agents, while keeping

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costs stable.\textsuperscript{126} Although the literature shows mixed results on crime deterrence from increased numbers of officers, this might be an attractive option in the face of ongoing staffing challenges, the changing demands of the job, and the greater call for visibility.

\begin{quote}
By year 15, an annual savings of nearly $180 million is possible for the LAPD, $35 million for the MDPD, and $22 million for the MPD, while maintaining the same level of policing.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{126} We used a more conservative replacement ratio of 30\% auxiliary private security and 70\% police. If a more gradual or more rapid scenario were desired, the proportions would change accordingly. We also expect that as police officers are increasingly able to focus on the core tasks of the job thanks to the offloading of additional tasks and the curtailing of mission creep, their job satisfaction will increase and turnover rates should decrease. This could potentially reduce the attrition rate in subsequent years, which might slow the transition somewhat, but this is not taken into account here. Future, more sophisticated simulations should take this into consideration.
Enhancing Public Safety While Saving Public Dollars with Auxiliary Private Security Agents
CONCLUSION

Inevitably, many will respond to the proposal put forward in this paper with skepticism: How can the maintenance of public safety and the suppression of crime, a core duty of the state, be privatized? But the reality of policing in the United States is that we have asked police to take on more and more responsibilities that are increasingly far removed from critical policing tasks. Our proposal responds to this reality by acknowledging that some policing activities are “core,” essential to the maintenance of public order and public goods, while others are “non-core” activities that do not require the response of a highly-trained (and highly-compensated) officer. We propose to expand the capacity of police to focus on their core activities by utilizing auxiliary private security agents to carry out other, less critical tasks.

Our proposal seeks to expand the capacity of police to respond to pressing public safety needs by supplementing police efforts with those of trained personnel who can take on some of those non-core policing tasks. These private agents are “force multipliers” that, through the division of labor, will enhance the reach and effectiveness of existing police resources. By offloading non-core tasks, such as administration, traffic control, and sobriety checkpoints, to properly trained contractors, efficiency can be improved, productivity increased, and public safety enhanced. As we have modelled, total budget reductions would be substantial, and the integration of personnel can be stretched over many years so as to gradually re-direct police to their core tasks while ensuring that performance standards are maintained, and even improved.

For instance, we found that the Miami-Dade Police Department could save, annually, between $35 million and $47 million if it were to offload its administrative burden (Table 2-1), between $17 million and $23 million in the outsourcing of traffic control (Table 2-2), and over $373,000 (or 39%, Table 2-3) if private agents were incorporated into the operation of sobriety checkpoints. The Milwaukee Police Department stands to save between $21 million and $29 million on administrative duties, and between $10 million and nearly $15 million on traffic control each year.127 The Los Angeles Police Department, because of its size, stands to gain the most in terms of savings: between $177 million and $236 million on administration, between $87 million and nearly $117 million on traffic, and some $571,000 (or 43%) on sobriety checkpoints, annually.

For ease of implementation, we have drawn up draft legislation that can be tailored and utilized by different jurisdictions (see Appendix C). Moreover, there are public accountability considerations that need to be addressed with execution. This is mandatory when providing a public service using tax dollars.

First, accountability can be instilled through the practice of competitive bidding, whereby the state can maintain measures of quality control over, yet have no financial responsibility for, the service.128 Several studies conclude that outsourcing public services may produce savings on the order of 20% without sacrificing service quality,129 and the jurisdictions we have analyzed have laws relating to competitive bidding that would uphold the safety and security of this service.130 These laws allow for the public sector to retain a reasonable amount of control over who wins contracts, how services are executed, and how performance is measured, as well as the authority and ability to replace contractors in cases of outright performance failure.131

127. Sobriety checkpoints are illegal under Wisconsin law, so they were not modelled for the Milwaukee Police Department.
In addition, policing is dangerous and requires the trust of the community to be effective. Central to this trust is the accountability of officers themselves. In this context, specific attention must be paid to how private agents would be treated under the current legal regime. Qualified immunity, developed over years through a series of Supreme Court decisions, largely exempts police officers from civil liability for violating people’s rights, even when they break the law.  

This legal regime has implications for our proposal. Private agents who act in the stead of police in certain circumstances may potentially be covered by qualified immunity case law. But the rationale for qualified immunity—that police often have to make split-second decisions in tense situations—seems far less applicable to private agents whose work is focused on administrative and other non-core tasks. This suggests that separate liability rules may need to be fashioned to govern this new class of security activities. In any event, this is an area that requires further research.

Despite these open questions, we believe that our proposal, far from being unrealistic or fanciful, accurately reflects and appropriately responds to the realities on the ground for policing in the United States. Our proposal deals with the fundamental reality that every hour police spend on non-core activities is an hour less that can be spent on making people and communities safer. It’s time to reset the balance between core and non-core policing activities—and in doing so, make our communities safer, preserve public resources, and increase officers’ job satisfaction by outsourcing non-core tasks to auxiliary private security agents.

APPENDIX A

A.1 Police Department Case Study Selections

By number of officers, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) is the third largest force in the United States in a state with the eighth highest per capita spend on policing. The Miami-Dade Police Department (MDPD) is the eighth largest department in the country and the largest local law enforcement department in the southeastern U.S. In addition, Miami-Dade has the highest concentration of serious mental illnesses of any county in the country, so officers there are likely spending elevated amounts of their time dealing with social issues. Moreover, Florida is the state with the second highest per capita police spending, meaning that relief from some of the financial pressure of policing through lower-cost auxiliary private security agents is likely to be welcome. Finally, the Milwaukee Police Department (MPD) is the twentieth largest force in the country, twenty-second in per capita spending, and is a jurisdiction where recent judicial decisions have resulted in an increased administrative burden that is only expected to grow.

While more than two-thirds of the police departments in the United States serve smaller jurisdictions, it is the larger departments that will likely reap the most benefit from the support of auxiliary private security agents. Not only is more time now spent on tasks that are not mission-critical or even crime-related, but departments nationwide have been struggling to attract new recruits while also maintaining their forces, and this is most evident in larger forces. Experts also contend that smaller forces lack either the accountability, the drive, or the resources needed to restructure. Therefore, while a full forensic analysis of these three police departments is outside the scope of this paper, a number of criteria were met which marked them as good examples of forces where policy change related to restructuring would be likely to have an impact.

A.2 How Tactics and Policies Inform Policing

Both the tactics and policies of policing inform its “culture.” However, it is difficult to define the “culture” of policing in the United States, and not simply because “culture” can be such a slippery concept, encompassing both formal and informal elements ranging from unwritten customs, the impact of legal cases, broad policy choices, and political developments. Culture also varies widely across the 18,000 distinct law enforcement agencies in the United States.

Further, any examination of “culture” must also reckon with the history of American policing. Formal policing in the U.S. developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries out of militia groups that aimed to protect their communities from military control. The 1840s saw the formation of the first formal police forces in America. The growth of cities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries demonstrated the need for stronger administrative control of police departments, which were corrupt and largely unsupervised, led by agents who abused their near-total discretion to act essentially as protection rackets. To counteract police corruption, reformers targeted patronage and reorganized their recruitment, selection, training, and retention.
practices. This was a significant step in “professionalizing” the police.

Today, police departments exist on a spectrum of professionalism. Yet despite this variety, and the occasionally lurid history of policing, there are distinct common elements that help to locate “police culture” in America. One of the most striking is the profession’s increasing adoption of military-style tactics, training, and weaponry. This has direct roots in the drug war, as politicians of all stripes encouraged the militarization of police and helped to import military equipment, tactics, and attitudes into local policing. Then-Attorney General Janet Reno made this connection clear in 1993, at the end of the Cold War. Speaking to a group of military officers, she invoked the military as a model for policing and invited the officers to turn their skills to “helping us with the war we’re now fighting daily in the streets of our towns and cities.” This instillation of military tactics will be further explored below, in the context of police training.

A.3 Education and Training

Educational Requirements

The criteria necessary to join the police force differs from state to state, though all states typically have several requirements in common such as age, citizenship, and a minimum level of physical fitness and education, to name a few. Educational requirements are generally set by state law, and individual agencies must meet or exceed the minimum standards. According to a recent survey of a nationally representative sample of local law enforcement agencies, 81.5% of agencies require at least a high school diploma, but only 13% choose to require more education than is required by state law. Generally, it is the larger forces that require higher levels of education: Roughly 30% of the largest departments in the country require, at minimum, a two-year college degree, while only about 10% of the smallest communities do.

Among the jurisdictions selected for this research paper, the MDPD has the most robust educational requirements. In addition to a high school diploma (or equivalent), an officer must have one or more of an associate degree, two years of active or reserve military duty, three years of work experience, and/or one year of full-time sworn law enforcement experience. This is in contrast to the LAPD, where a high school education or GED will suffice, and the MPD, which requires a high school education (or GED) plus an associate degree, although the degree requirement can be fulfilled within five years of employment plus tuition support. Research shows mostly positive effects of higher education requirements for police officers. For instance, officers with a college education tend to be less likely to use force. Moreover, studies show that through lower liability risk and fewer on-the-job accidents and injuries, officers with a bachelor’s degree or higher actually save police departments money. These officers are also more likely to take on leadership roles and be promoted than officers


149. Ibid.


151. Or at least 60 college credits.

152. Work experience needs to be continuous full-time, post-high school.


154. Alternatively, a California High School Proficiency Examination (CHSPE) will be sufficient. A two-year or a four-year college degree from an accredited institution may also be substituted for the high school requirement. City of Los Angeles, Home, Qualifications, consulted May 18, 2022.

155. Or at least 60 college credits.

156. City of Milwaukee, Myths About Milwaukee Police Hiring, I have to already have my degree in order to apply, consulted May 18, 2022.


without a college degree, are more reliable, and are more committed to the organization. Thus, although it is outside the scope of this paper, the literature indicates there is value in revisiting the relatively minimal educational requirements and training for police. In the context of police reform and the use of private agents as force multipliers, there may also be a benefit to having additional training and education requirements for police as compared to the auxiliary private security agents who supplement them. Further analysis into the potential impact of increased educational requirements for officers in public-facing and elite positions is recommended.

Training

In addition to education, training is of utmost importance in meeting the contemporary challenges of today’s police work. Regardless of where an officer may have attended a police academy, 49 of the 50 states have a minimum training standard comprising minimum training hours and/or learning objectives and overall competencies. A 2021 comparative analysis of all states indicates that, excluding field training, police academies typically train recruits for a minimum average of approximately 633 hours (see Table A-1). Of the three states in this paper, Florida had the highest required number of basic training hours (770), followed by Wisconsin (720) and California (664). Overall, these states ranked 8th, 13th, and 17th, respectively. These requirements, however, are the state-mandated minimums, and numerous regional academies report requirements that far exceed these minimums.

Though the police academy varies from state to state, when curricula are analyzed, there are characteristically six main topic areas in basic training programs in state and local law enforcement training academies (see Table A-2).

Basic police academies generally employ one of two training models: stress-based training programs and non-stress training programs. Non-stress training programs emphasize academic achievement, support, and physical training, and are present in about a fifth of the academies around the country. On the other hand, almost half of the academies in the country utilize the former, which is modelled after the military and often involves considerable psychological pressure and rigorous physical demand, as well as emphasizing military-style drills, public discipline, withholding privileges, and immediate reaction to infractions. While recruits in these training academies tend to receive more training hours than are mandated by the state, research has linked the militarization of police with increased violent behavior among police officers. In addition, there is comparatively little emphasis on the profession of policing, relating to the public, or even legal requirements relating to the use of force. As law enforcement has been increasingly militarized since at least the early 1970s, there have been reforms to training to adjust this “warrior” mentality to manage police use of force.

Mental Health and Crisis Intervention Training

Many departments require additional education and training on mental illness and other social dysfunction. In addition to requiring typically a higher than average number of overall training...
### Average number of basic training hours for new recruits in police academies, by state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Total number of training hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>463.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>605</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** These averages are approximate and are for the states that have mandatory basic police training curricula. Hawaii has no state-mandated training standards. Idaho, Minnesota, New Jersey, and North Dakota have state-mandated training standards that do not require minimum hours and instead specify performance objectives.

Table A-2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main topic areas in basic police training programs in state and local police academies</th>
<th>Average number of hours per recruit</th>
<th>Estimated proportion of basic training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol procedures</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigations</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency vehicle operations</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report writing</td>
<td>25</td>
<td><strong>33.7%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic first aid/CPR</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic accident investigations</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computers/information systems</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weapons/defensive tactics/use of force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearm skills</td>
<td>71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-defense</td>
<td>60</td>
<td><strong>26.6%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of force</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-lethal weapons</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-improvement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and fitness</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionalism</td>
<td>11</td>
<td><strong>14.1%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics and integrity</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stress prevention/management</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal/constitutional law</td>
<td>53</td>
<td><strong>13.6%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic law</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile justice law/procedures</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social issues</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic violence</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental illness</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic preparedness and terrorism</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual assault</td>
<td>6</td>
<td><strong>8.4%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual assault</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimes against children</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim response</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gangs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td><strong>3.7%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The average number of hours of instruction does not include those academies that did not provide this type of instruction.

hours and more than the minimum educational requirements, the MDPD, LAPD, and MPD also have all implemented some form of training on mental health and/or crisis intervention that is more comprehensive than the average. For example, in the MPD and LAPD, all officers receive 40 hours of training specific to dealing with mental health crises. In the MDPD, between 2010 and 2016, there were 68,000 mental health calls, 14,000 of which were diverted to treatment through the Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) training, which is a 40-hour training program. In comparison, according to a 2021 study, the median amount of time spent on mental health topics was 20 hours in academy training and four hours post-academy training.

Research shows that policing skills, such as those that make up the core competencies mentioned above, can be modified through training and experience. Therefore, for effective policing, training should target the skills and competencies sought. While a complete analysis of the public value of the content of police training is outside the scope of this paper, it is evident that reform in this area may be needed. Some forces also have programs whereby social workers or other mental health professionals are partnered with police officers.

174. There are other components to the CIT that are in addition to this basic 40-hour training. Habsi W. Kaba, “Crisis Intervention Team Miami-Dade County,” South Florida Crisis Intervention Team, 2017, p. 15.
APPENDIX B

B.1 Auxiliary Private Security Personnel

Private security is defined by the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) International as “the nongovernmental, private-sector practice of protecting people, property, and information, conducting investigations, and otherwise safeguarding an organization’s assets.” 177 According to ASIS (and experts attending its symposiums), the field of private security in the United States can be divided into several core elements, including physical security, personnel security, investigations, loss prevention, and crime prevention, among others.178

Minimum Standards

Each state has the power to require and set the minimum standards for security personnel, and has made some attempt to regulate the industry.179 Therefore, training and licensing requirements differ widely across the country and also depend, in part, on the specific duties performed.180 For example, some states register, certify, and/or license both armed and unarmed security, while others have no requirements for unarmed security personnel181 or leave the process up to local jurisdictions.182 Generally speaking, however, all states tend to maintain the same general requirements related to age, absence of violent or felony convictions, and a minimum level of education. While less robust than those required of police officers, these requirements ensure a degree of quality and public safety.

In California, registration is necessary through the Bureau of Security and Investigative Service and requires 32 hours of training plus another 8 hours of continuous training to be retaken each year.183 An armed guard requires special training and a firearms permit that must be renewed every two years and that comes with its own requirements for renewal.184 Security guards also need special training to use tear gas or to carry a baton while on duty.185

In Florida, security guard licensing is overseen by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Division of Licensing.186 The bare minimum licensing requirements relate to the class “D” licence,187 which requires a minimum of 40 hours professional training.188 To be armed necessitates a class “G” license, which requires an additional 28-hour course which includes 12 hours on the legal aspect of using a firearm, 8 to 11 hours on firearm safety and operational training, and 8 hours of firearm qualification.189 Class “G” license holders also need to undergo 4 hours of requalifying training annually.

In Wisconsin, security guards must be credentialed by the Department of Safety and Professional Services.190 Unarmed security guards are required

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178. Also included is information systems security, risk management, legal aspects, emergency and contingency planning, fire protection, crisis management, disaster management, counterterrorism, competitive intelligence, executive protection, violence in the workplace, crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED), and security architecture and engineering. ASIS Foundation, “Compendium of the ASIS Academic/Practitioner Symposium 2007-2018,” United States of America, 2019, p. 4


184. This training is on the power to arrest and additional written and range qualifiers. In addition, a firearms assessment test to ensure appropriate judgment, restraint, and self-control to carry a firearm while on duty is required within six months. Renewal requirements include (but are not limited to) a two-hour review training on force de-escalation and a passing of the written firearm qualification with a score of 85% or more. Bureau of Security & Investigative Services, Firearms Permit FACT SHEET, consulted May 27, 2022.


186. Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Division of Licensing, consulted May 27, 2022.


189. Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Class “G” Statewide Firearm License Requirements, consulted May 30, 2022.

to pass a character and a fitness requirement, but there is no minimum training requirement. To become an armed guard, on the other hand, a firearm permit is compulsory, which requires 36 hours of training in the areas of safety, the legal use of firearms, lawful detention, and criminal and civil liability. A six-hour refresher must be taken yearly.

**Private Requirements Are Generally Stricter**

Like police forces, private security companies are free to require additional training or education in addition to the minimum, which ensures a degree of quality to their work. A 2016 study that examines the nature and extent of licensing requirements and minimum standards shows that irrespective of state regulations, the minimum training requirements of private security companies far exceed those of the states in which they operate. In addition, while the three states that house the jurisdictions under study differ in their minimum standards, all require additional training requirements should security guards be armed as opposed to unarmed. This is important in the context of the proposed reforms in an environment where the professionalism of private security as auxiliary agents will be increasingly important.

**B.2 Other Professionals**

In addition, while the focus of this research paper is on private security as auxiliary private agents, it would be an oversight to not explore, albeit briefly, supplementation by mental health or other professionals, which has the potential to also elicit many of the benefits of auxiliary private security agents.

**Merit and Need**

While training and education on mental health has increased significantly across the United States over the past two decades, in 2019 alone there were 1,017 people shot and killed by police and approximately 25% of them involved mental illness.

While there are examples of police departments fortifying their basic training programs with additional components related to crisis intervention or mental illness, and more skill-based training in this area may be appropriate, police officers are not and should not be expected to be social workers. The increasing rate of mental health issues in the population also needs to be considered alongside the snowballing amount of officer time spent dealing with these issues. The incorporation of mental health or other professionals has the potential for enhanced public service and for resource and cost savings for departments and governments. The resultant increased job satisfaction and morale that comes with shedding non-core tasks can also further broaden the reach of police.

**In Practice**

The integration of mental health professionals alongside police officers has already been considered in a number of jurisdictions across the United States. In response to over 10,000 mental health calls placed to 911 in 2020, in August 2021, the city of Boston launched a pilot dual police model program that increases the role of mental health professionals and decreases the role of police in responding to mental health crises. In addition, officers have been mandated an additional 44 to 46
hours of training, a portion of which applies to men-
tal illness.\footnote{200}

This is not the first time Boston has approached
this issue in this way: In 2011, a co-responder pro-
gram was adopted which placed a mental health
clinician alongside an officer, together responding
to service calls where mental illness was indicat-
ed.\footnote{201} This allows each professional to bring their
specific skillset to the situation and focus on their
areas of expertise, which has been shown to have
positive impacts including a better use of the
criminal justice system and safer and more en-
hanced interactions between civilians and
police.\footnote{202}

The Milwaukee Police Department launched Crisis
Assessment Response Teams (CART) back in 2013,
a program that utilizes this co-responder model
whereby three specially trained officers are joined
by social workers.\footnote{203} In 2021 alone, CART re-
sponded to 928 incidents, and in 85% of them, the
subject did not need to be detained. Recently, the
program has been granted approval to double its
capacity to six teams, a measure which appears to
be needed, as evidenced by MPD officers shoot-
ing a man in a mental health crisis earlier this
year.\footnote{204} A number of other cities and police forces,
including the LAPD, have expressed interest in a
similar co-responder program utilizing social ser-
vice professionals that also include homeless out-
reach workers.\footnote{205}

Research shows this co-responder approach to be
a promising practice.\footnote{206} A recent systematic review
of the literature related to co-response models

\footnote{200. Topics included in the additional required training include
responding to emergencies involving the mentally ill (3 hours),
de-escalation and use of force (3 hours), cultural competency and
responding to mass gatherings (3 hours), human trafficking (3 hours),
law enforcement officer mental wellness (2 hours), law enforcement
officer suicide prevention (2 hours), critical incident stress management
(2 hours), and legal (6 hours). City of Boston, “Boston Police Reforms:
September 2021 Community Update,” October 4, 2021.}

\footnote{201. Melissa S. Morabito et al., “Police Response to People with Mental
Illnesses in a Major U.S. City: The Boston Experience with the
Co-Responder Model,” Victims and Offenders, Vol. 13, No. 8, p. 1094.}

\footnote{202. Ibid.}

\footnote{203. Ben Jordan, “When and why Milwaukee police partner with social
workers to respond to mental health crises,” WTMJ-TV Milwaukee,
March 7, 2022.}

\footnote{204. Ibid.}

\footnote{205. CBS News, “Proposal would use social workers, not LAPD, for some
calls,” June 17, 2020.}

\footnote{206. Melissa S. Morabito et al., op. cit., footnote 201, pp. 1095 and 1102.}

\footnote{207. Stephen Puntis et al., “A systematic review of co-responder models of
police mental health ‘street’ triage,” BMC Psychiatry, Vol. 18, No. 256, 2018,
p. 8.}

\footnote{208. Ibid.}
APPENDIX C

AN ACT to permit the institution of auxiliary professionals to assist and expand the capacity of sworn law enforcement officers.

Section 1. Findings.

(a) Increasingly, the on-duty time of police officers in localities and political subdivisions in this state is constrained by administrative and other tasks that divert them from core policing functions. Studies suggest that currently, only 10 to 18 percent of a sworn officer’s time on duty is spent on tasks related to the core policing functions of controlling, preventing, or investigating crime. Likewise, only four percent of policing time is spent in controlling, preventing, or investigating violent crime.

(b) Among the tasks that consume an inordinate amount of sworn officers’ time are: tasks related to record-keeping and reporting; routine evidence collection tasks; escort duties; and low-level traffic and event management.

(c) The proliferation of non-core policing tasks that take up the time of police in this state has also significantly impacted the well-being and job satisfaction of sworn peace officers, creating significant challenges related to recruitment and retention.

(c) It is the finding of the General Assembly that authorizing the creation of a force of auxiliary personnel, lacking the power of arrest but otherwise trained to assist police in the completion of non-core policing functions, will enhance public safety and the efficiency of police by permitting more highly trained officers to focus on core public safety duties. These auxiliaries, by relieving police from administrative and other tasks, would also increase the time available for additional police training. Finally, these auxiliaries would operate at a lower cost relative to sworn officers, reducing localities’ law enforcement operating costs.

Section 2. Authority.

(a) Starting on the first day of the fiscal year following the enactment of this section, localities and political subdivisions of this State that are permitted to maintain a force of sworn peace officers are authorized to create an auxiliary force of personnel to assist police in the completion of law enforcement duties.

(b) These auxiliary personnel are authorized to assist sworn officers in the completion of their duties to the extent deemed appropriate considering their training, expertise, and qualifications, but in no event shall personnel contracted pursuant to the authority provided by this section possess the power of arrest.

(c) The Attorney General is directed to develop and promulgate rules relating to the required training and qualifications of these auxiliary personnel, as well as the permissible use of these personnel, which requirements must be incorporated into any contract for services relating to the provision of these personnel. However, a locality or political subdivision of this State is permitted to require additional training or qualifications for personnel contracted to provide services pursuant to this section.

(d) All personnel contracted or retained pursuant to the authority provided by this section shall be clearly differentiated from sworn officers by way of uniform, badges, and other indicia of rank or office.

(e) Any locality or subdivision of this State that contracts for services pursuant to the authority created by this section shall report data to the Attorney General in a manner and format to be determined by the Attorney General.

(f) The Attorney General is directed to report to the General Assembly at regular intervals, and in no event less than every three years, regarding the implementation of the authority created by this section, including but not limited to its impact on crime rates, public safety, the public treasury, public awareness of auxiliary policing personnel, and other relevant impacts or outcomes.

(g) The authority created by this section shall sunset 6 (six) years after the enactment of this section, unless extended by the General Assembly.
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As a public policy analyst, Krystle collects and analyzes data related to public policies and their success, or lack thereof. Through rigorous examination, she works to make sense of these policies and to analyze and evaluate their actual effects, which often diverge from their expected results. She appreciates the impact that her research can have on Canadians, and enjoys having to think critically and creatively, all while keeping up to date on economic and policy developments.

Krystle holds a BA, BSc, Master of Public Policy, and Master of Science, all from the University of Calgary. She has received several academic scholarships for the quality of her work at the graduate level and has published articles in a number of specialized academic journals. Prior to joining the MEI team in February 2021 she worked at the School of Public Policy and collaborated with the MEI as an Associate Researcher.

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