Policy Choices and the Decline of Entrepreneurship in Canada

Economic Note showing how hostile tax policy, well-intentioned government programs, and costly and protective regulations have discouraged entrepreneurship for decades
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| Canadian entrepreneurship in ‘sharp decline,’ warns think tank (National Post, April 23, 2026)
Déclin des entreprises d’ici (Le Journal de Montréal, April 23, 2026) |
Interview with Charles Lammam (The Jas Johal Show, Global News, April 24, 2026)
Interview (in French) with Gabriel Giguère (Trudeau-Landry, FM93, April 24, 2026) Interview (in French) with Gabriel Giguère (Couture dans le mid, Radio X, April 27, 2026) |
This Economic Note was prepared by Charles Lammam, Senior Fellow at the MEI, in collaboration with Emmanuelle B. Faubert, Economist at the MEI. The MEI’s Regulation Series aims to examine the often unintended consequences for individuals and businesses of various laws and rules, in contrast with their stated goals.
Canada’s policy conversation has lately focused predominantly on nation-building megaprojects like pipeline construction, critical minerals development, and LNG terminals. These projects matter; Canada needs to build infrastructure at scale and faster.
But while Ottawa and the provinces debate resource extraction, entrepreneurship—the heartbeat of innovation, job creation, and economic growth—is in sharp decline. Indeed, as we shall see below, entrepreneurship has been declining for decades in Canada.
While the causes are complex, recent policy choices have exacerbated the structural trend, particularly since 2018. This includes tax policies that discourage entrepreneurship, government programs and employment that crowd out private capital and entrepreneurial talent, and regulations that increase costs and protect incumbents from competition.
Declining Entrepreneurship
In 2000, self-employment accounted for roughly 16.1% of total employment in Canada. By 2025, that share had fallen to 12.9%, the lowest in decades. For Quebec, the story is similar: self-employment accounted for roughly 14.8% of total employment in 2000, but had fallen to 11.0% by 2025.(1)
Self-employment includes everyone from ambitious founders building scalable firms to professionals working solo gigs. What matters for economic dynamism is primarily the former: businesses with employees, growth ambitions, and the capacity to challenge incumbents.
A sharper measure thus focuses on self-employed Canadians with paid employees.(2) As a share of the working-age population (ages 15–64), this rate stood at 3.9% in both Canada and Quebec in 2000. By 2025, these rates had fallen to 2.6% and 2.1%, respectively(3) (see Figure 1).

In absolute terms, the number of self-employed Canadians with paid help peaked in 2005 at approximately 867,000 but had dropped to 716,000 by 2025, a decline of nearly 18%, despite a growing population. Over the same period, Quebec saw its self-employed with paid help fall from around 194,000 to 122,000, a decline of more than a third.
Business entry and exit rates tell the same story. In 2023, new firm creation sat at 12.3% of all active businesses, around half the 25% Canada achieved in the early 1980s.(4) Exits have also declined, pointing to an economy where creative destruction—the process by which innovative new firms challenge and replace existing ones—is not happening at robust rates.
The number of self-employed Canadians with paid help peaked in 2005 at approximately 867,000 but had dropped to 716,000 by 2025.
This matters because new businesses challenge incumbents, push adaptation, and move resources to more productive uses. Without this competitive pressure, economies stagnate.
The reasons for Canada’s entrepreneurial decline are complex. An aging population, cultural attitudes toward risk, and housing affordability all play a role.(5) The decline reflects policy frameworks built up over decades, but recent policy choices have made things worse.
Hostile Tax Policy
The decline in entrepreneurship became more pronounced after 2018, coinciding with a series of federal tax changes that raised costs and showed hostility toward entrepreneurs.
In 2016, the Trudeau government raised the top federal income tax rate from 29% to 33% for income over $200,000.(6) Combined with provincial rates, entrepreneurs in Quebec now face a marginal rate of 53.3%,(7) fifth highest among OECD countries.(8) This matters for entrepreneurship: Canadian evidence finds that increasing the top income tax rate reduces the entry of new employer businesses.(9)
In 2017, Finance Minister Bill Morneau proposed sweeping tax changes targeting private corporations, accusing entrepreneurs of exploiting “loopholes” and engaging in tax avoidance.(10) Business owners and innovators felt singled out for what amounts to standard tax planning. Although the proposals were later modified, the episode signalled that government viewed entrepreneurs with suspicion rather than seeing them as drivers of economic growth.
When a small firm crosses the $500,000 taxable income threshold, its marginal tax rate on corporate income increases dramatically.
More recently, the 2024 federal budget proposed raising the capital gains inclusion rate, again framing entrepreneurs as tax cheats. The move triggered strong pushback from the entrepreneurial community, as such taxes discourage long-term investment and entrepreneurial activity.(11) Economist Douglas Cumming estimated that raising the inclusion rate would have reduced venture capital deals by 20% and private equity investment by over 48%.(12) The government fostered prolonged uncertainty through 2024–2025, delaying implementation before Prime Minister Carney finally cancelled the measure in March 2025. By then, much damage had been done.(13)
Since 2018, the federal government has increased other costs for entrepreneurs by raising carbon and payroll taxes.(14) The effect has been to discourage entrepreneurship and divert resources that could otherwise support hiring or expansion.
Paradoxically, Canada’s tax system also discourages scaling.(15) When a small firm crosses the $500,000 taxable income threshold, its marginal tax rate on corporate income increases dramatically. In Quebec, a small firm’s business tax rate more than doubles from 12.2% to 26.5%. The gap varies across the provinces, and is most significant in Prince Edward Island where the large business tax rate is 30%, triple the small business rate of 10%.(16) Unsurprisingly, Canada has a disproportionate share of micro‑firms compared with the U.S.(17)
Crowding Out Capital and Talent
Well-intentioned government programs often crowd out private capital and distort entrepreneurial incentives.
Canadian research shows that firms financed by government‑sponsored venture capital underperform their privately backed peers in value creation (measured in likelihood and size of Initial Public Offerings and Mergers and Acquisitions) and innovation (measured in terms of patent generation).(18) Government‑backed funds not only invest in lower‑quality firms; they also displace more effective private investment.(19)
The Business Development Bank of Canada illustrates the scale of government involvement. It is the country’s largest venture capital investor with more than $6 billion in assets under management,(20) yet according to an analysis of a shelved government report by a media publication specializing in the Canadian innovation ecosystem, private investors increasingly view it as a competitor rather than a support.(21) When entrepreneurs can access subsidized government funding, private fund managers struggle to raise capital.(22)
Firms financed by government-sponsored venture capital underperform their privately backed peers in value creation and innovation.
Investissement Québec follows a similar pattern. In 2003, the “Brunet report” examined Quebec’s venture capital market and found that excessive government involvement was displacing private capital, recommending the province reduce its direct role in venture financing.(23)
Two decades later, a report from Réseau Capital found the ecosystem had reduced its reliance on public funding from around 70% to 40%, though recent years have seen this trend partially reverse.(24) The report notes funding “remains fragile and highly dependent on public and para-public financing, with the exception of a few managers who finance themselves mainly from private sources.” Over the past decade, the provincial agency has deployed $800 million in venture capital.(25)
In the first half of 2025, no exits of venture capital-backed companies were publicly disclosed in Quebec(26)—a sign that government-backed ecosystems may not be generating the returns that would attract sustained private capital. Exits, such as initial public offerings or acquisitions, are the primary mechanism for returning capital to investors. Without these events, the flow of recycled capital back into the ecosystem stalls, leaving investors with less cash to fund the next generation of high-growth firms.
When government provides subsidized capital, it disrupts price discovery and weakens the discipline that typically develops between entrepreneurs and investors. Instead of focusing on customers and scaling operations, entrepreneurs learn to navigate bureaucracy and meet grant criteria. The proliferation of overlapping programs—federal accelerators, provincial innovation funds, municipal entrepreneurship centres—compounds this dynamic, rewarding those skilled at accessing public support rather than building sustainable businesses.
Exacerbating the challenge is the crowding out of entrepreneurial talent. As the public sector in Canada and Quebec has grown in recent years relative to total employment, self-employment has fallen(27) (see Figure 2). This shift represents a reallocation of talent and ambition away from entrepreneurial activity toward government employment. Public sector jobs offer stability, benefits, and defined career progression—attributes that can attract capable individuals who might otherwise build companies.

Costly and Protective Regulations
Regulation affects entrepreneurship on two fronts: compliance costs that make operating a business more expensive, and regulatory protection of markets and incumbents that reduces competitive pressure.
On compliance costs, the scale of the burden is substantial. The Canadian Federation of Independent Business estimates the total regulatory cost for small business across all government levels at $51.5 billion in 2024, a 13.5% jump from 2020.(28) Of that total, $17.9 billion represents pure “red tape” attributable to unnecessary or duplicative compliance.
Businesses are burning through 768 million hours annually on regulatory paperwork, the equivalent of roughly 394,000 full-time jobs. For the average business owner, that means losing 32 working days a year to red tape alone. Small firms with fewer than five employees are hit hardest, paying over $10,200 per employee in annual compliance costs. These regulatory demands shape the advice entrepreneurs give aspiring business owners: only 18% recommend starting a business right now.(29)
Statistics Canada documented the impacts of a 37% rise in federal regulatory restrictions between 2006 and 2021.(30) This surge was directly associated with a 1.7-percentage-point decline in GDP growth, alongside drops in business investment, productivity, employment, and the rate of new business formation.
Small firms with fewer than five employees are hit hardest, paying over $10,200 per employee in annual compliance costs.
The second regulatory challenge involves protection of incumbents. According to one estimate, over 20% of Canadian economic activity is shielded from competition as a matter of deliberate policy choice.(31) Through foreign ownership restrictions and other mechanisms, Canadian policy limits entry and competition in many key sectors.(32) The regulatory barriers outlined above reinforce this protection, insulating incumbents while discouraging new firms from entering the market.
Professional licensing regimes fragment labour markets across provinces.(33) While there has been some progress recently, qualified professionals licensed in one province routinely face months of additional requirements before they can work in another, leaving them idle, and employers underserved.
The potential economic gains from increased competition are significant. A Competition Bureau-commissioned study analyzing 15 OECD countries over 25 years estimates that aligning Canada’s regulations in energy, transport, retail distribution, and professional services with international best practices could boost GDP by anywhere from 6.5% to 10% over the long run.(34) Meanwhile, the IMF estimates that eliminating internal trade barriers—currently equivalent to a 9.5% national tariff—could raise real GDP by roughly 7%, or $210 billion in today’s dollars.(35)
When regulations protect established players from new entrants, entrepreneurship becomes less attractive. Aspiring entrepreneurs face not just the normal challenges of building a business but artificial barriers that favour those already in the market. The result is less innovation, less competition, and less dynamism.
Conclusion
Canada possesses world‑class universities that produce exceptional talent, and our institutions offer a strong foundation for national prosperity. Yet these advantages do not automatically translate into economic success; they require the support of sound public policy. The current reality is clear: entrepreneurship is in retreat, and well‑intentioned government policy has played a direct role in this decline. Reversing course will require a fundamental shift in our policy choices.
References
- Author’s calculations. Statistics Canada, Table 14-10-0027-01: Employment by class of worker, annual (x 1,000), January 9, 2026.
- Author’s calculations. Idem.
- Figure 1 displays data from 2000 to 2025. The rate of entrepreneurship — measured by self-employed Canadians with paid help as a share of the working-age population — peaked in the early 1990s and has been declining since.
- Statistics Canada, Table 33-10-0164-01: Business Dynamics measures, by industry, February 12, 2026; Ryan Macdonald “Business Entry and Exit Rates in Canada: A 30-year Perspective,” Analytical Paper, August 2014; Charles Lammam, “The troubling data behind Canada’s entrepreneurship decline: DeepDive,” The Hub, February 27, 2026.
- For additional discussion on these factors see: Charles Lammam, idem.
- TaxTips.ca, Canada – Federal 2015 and 2016 Tax Brackets and Marginal Tax Rates, May 19, 2025.
- TaxTips.ca, Quebec 2025 and 2026 Tax Rates & Tax Brackets, February 22, 2026.
- See Appendix Figure A1 on the MEI’s website displaying the top marginal tax rates on personal income in OECD countries
- Ergete Ferede, “Entrepreneurship and personal income tax: evidence from Canadian provinces,” Small Business Economics, Vol. 56, 2021, pp. 1765–1781.
- Department of Finance Canada, Tax Planning Using Private Corporations, 2017.
- Jack Mintz, “DeepDive: The capital gains tax increase on Canada’s economy was far from trivial,” The Hub, September 25, 2024; Emmanuelle B. Faubert, “Increasing the Capital Gains Inclusion Rate: A Tax Hike on Investing and Entrepreneurship,” Viewpoint, MEI, May 2, 2024.
- Douglas Cumming, “Capital Gains Tax Hikes in Canada and their Impact on Venture Capital and Private Equity,” Fraser Institute, March 7, 2025.
- The federal government did increase the lifetime capital gains exemption for qualified small business corporation shares to $1.25 million, indexed to inflation. While this provides modest relief for entrepreneurs selling their businesses, it is not major reform. Department of Finance Canada, Budget 2024 – Tax Measures: Supplementary Information, 2024.
- Charles Lammam, op. cit., endnote 4.
- Josip Lesica, “Responsiveness of small businesses to corporate income taxation in Canada: A summary of new findings,” Economic and Social Reports, Statistics Canada, March 26, 2025.
- See Appendix Figure A2 on the MEI’s website showing the combined small business and general corporate tax rates in the provinces. BDO Canada, “2026 Corporate Income Tax Rates,” April 8, 2026.
- National Bank of Canada, “More micro-enterprises in Canada: Policies for small businesses are holding back productivity growth,” Special Report, October 28, 2025.
- James A. Brander, Edward Egan, and Thomas F. Hellmann, “Government Sponsored Versus Private Venture Capital: Canadian Evidence,” NBER Working Paper No. 14029, May 2008, p. 2.
- Labour‑Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations (LSVCCs) are a clear example. Created with federal and provincial tax incentives to address perceived funding gaps, they attracted retail investors through generous tax credits. Yet research has consistently found that LSVCCs underperformed private VC funds and created distortions that discouraged institutional capital formation. Douglas Cumming, “Financing Entrepreneurs: Better Canadian Policy for Venture Capital Policy,” C.D. Howe Institute, Commentary No. 247, April 2007.
- Madison McLauchlan, “BDC Capital targets late-stage tech companies with nearly $1 billion in new fund commitments,” BetaKit, February 18, 2025.
- Douglas Soltys, “Is BDC too big to change?” BetaKit, February 16, 2026.
- Notably, Canadian venture capital as a percentage of GDP has fallen from 0.47% in 2021 to 0.20% in 2024. OECD, OECD Data Explorer, February 25, 2026.
- Rhéal Séguin, “Quebec urged to revise capital role,” The Globe and Mail, December 18, 2003; Department of Finance Canada, It’s Time, Committee to review the structure of securities regulation in Canada, December 2003.
- Réseau Capital, “The evolution of Quebec’s private venture capital industry and sources of capital,” November 2024, p. 7; Isabelle Kirkwood, “Report: Québec venture ecosystem ‘still highly dependent’ on public and para-public funding,” BetaKit, September 3, 2024.
- Sean Silcoff, “Vention raises $150-million as Quebec makes biggest venture bet yet,” The Globe and Mail, January 27, 2026. The agency also operates a $200 million early-stage fund launched in October 2025. See: Madison McLauchlin, “Investissement Québec transforms early-stage program into $200-million VC fund,” BetaKit, October 21, 2025.
- Madison McLauchlan, “Seed-stage rebound a bright spot in Quebec’s ‘gloomy’ VC landscape: report,” BetaKit, August 14, 2025.
- Public sector employees include all workers employed by federal, provincial and local governments, government agencies, Crown corporations, and publicly funded establishments like schools, universities, and hospitals.
- Canadian Federation of Independent Business, Canada’s Red Tape Report, 7th edition, 2025, p. 3.
- Ibid., pp. 4, 8-9.
- Statistics Canada, “Regulatory restrictions and economic performance in Canada, 2006 to 2021,” Economic and Social Reports, Catalogue no. 11F0019M, February 10, 2025.
- Vincent Geloso, “Canada Still Needs to Open Up to Competition,” Fraser Institute, 2024.
- Charles Lammam, “It’s time to rein in Canada’s red tape state: DeepDive,” The Hub, March 12, 2026; Charles Lammam, op. cit., endnote 4.
- Gabriel Giguère and Vincent Geloso, Boosting Income Mobility through Economic Liberty in Quebec, Research Paper, MEI, October 17, 2024.
- Competition Bureau Canada, “Study finds Canada could unlock major economic gains through stronger competition,” News release, February 4, 2026.
- International Monetary Fund, Canada: 2026 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report, IMF Country Report, 2026, p. 29.


