Canada Shouldn’t Give Trump Ammunition for His Illegal Trade War

Economic Note showing how dollar-for-dollar retaliation hands Trump a basis to defend his “statute shopping” tactics in court and risks undermining the American public’s strong opposition to tariffs
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This Economic Note was prepared by Phillip W. Magness, Senior Fellow at the MEI, in collaboration with Gabriel Giguère, Senior Policy Analyst at the MEI. The MEI’s Taxation Series aims to shine a light on the fiscal policies of governments and to study their effect on economic growth and the standard of living of citizens.
Canadians are justifiably frustrated over the recent collapse of trade negotiations with the United States. Since taking office in 2025, President Donald Trump has pursued an aggressive policy of protectionist tariffs under the mistaken belief that the U.S. trade deficit constitutes an economic emergency. These policies have extended to almost every country on Earth, with sudden and haphazard revisions to previously announced policies becoming the norm.
Canada has borne its share of these measures. Since February 2025, it has served as a testing ground for the exercise of discretionary tariff powers that Trump has imposed through executive order (see Table 1).

Most of these claimed powers have faced serious challenges in the United States court system. In February 2026, a landmark ruling by the Supreme Court overturned the April 2025 “Liberation Day” tariff measures and resulted in refund orders that are currently estimated to total about US$180 billion.(1) Trump nonetheless doubled down on his policies, seeking to reinstate the overturned tariff measures under different laws. He has now imposed a set of targeted tariffs as high as 50% on approximately US$20 billion worth of Canadian goods, starting in August 2026.(2) More recently, the White House imposed outright prohibitions on Canadian dairy products, alcohol, and motorcycles.(3)
Canadians are rightfully concerned, as the United States is the main destination for most Canadian exports (see Table 2). Canadian responses to these U.S. tariffs have been swift and aggressive. Prime Minister Mark Carney unveiled a policy of matching them with dollar-for-dollar retaliatory measures,(4) and provincial governments are considering additional restrictions targeting strategic goods from the United States. Most Canadians correctly perceive the United States as the instigator of this trade war, pointing to a pattern of derogatory insults coming from the White House. As of this writing, 73% of Canadians support dollar-for-dollar retaliation, imposing tariffs on C$28 billion worth of US products.(5) Since the economic incidence of tariffs falls primarily on the country imposing these measures, Canadians can expect both direct and indirect economic pain from them.(6)

While Canada has legitimate grievances against the Trump administration’s policies and behaviour, the pursuit of dollar-for-dollar retaliation inadvertently strengthens Trump’s hand in defending these measures from a likely court challenge in the United States. The new measures rely on an obscure clause of U.S. law known as Section 338. While Trump claims sweeping tariff authorities under this provision, this 1930 law was likely superseded by subsequent statutes in the 1960s and 1970s that restricted its exercise. These factors render it susceptible to a legal challenge, much like the “Liberation Day” tariffs that the courts struck down earlier this year.
Trump’s legal argument for reviving this clause rests upon his claim that Canada is “discriminating” against American products.(7) The economic arguments and empirical data behind Trump’s claims about Canada are fundamentally unsound(8) and appear to be based on his belief that a $60-billion dollar trade deficit represents actual losses of US money to Canada.(9) In no small irony, the Carney government’s dollar-for-dollar response breathes inadvertent legitimacy into Trump’s claims by introducing precisely the types of discriminatory restrictions that the Section 338 tariffs first posited.
Section 338 Tariffs Explained
After losing his “Liberation Day” case at the U.S. Supreme Court, President Trump ordered U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer to pursue a tactic known as “statute shopping.” In simple terms, he tasked Greer with scouring the texts of old trade laws in search of clauses that could be used to reconstruct and reinstate the tariffs the Supreme Court had invalidated.
Trump has pursued an aggressive policy of protectionist tariffs under the mistaken belief that the U.S. trade deficit constitutes an economic emergency.
This tactic arises from a unique peculiarity of U.S. constitutional law. The authority to enact tariffs is explicitly bestowed upon Congress by Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. This tariff power remains with Congress today, but since the early 20th century, Congress has also delegated some discretionary authority to modify tariff rates to the president. This delegated authority is not unlimited; indeed, it is governed by the “intelligible principle” test of a 1928 Supreme Court ruling that defined the boundaries of presidential tariff authority.(10) Congress may authorize the president to impose and alter tariffs, but that statute must specify the set of “intelligible” conditions under which the president can act.
Section 338 is no ordinary statute. It comes from the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930—the notorious protectionist measure that precipitated a collapse in global trade at the outset of the Great Depression. In addition to this historical baggage, Section 338’s current legal standing is dubious. Before Trump, no president had ever attempted to impose tariffs under this clause. Indeed, the last known federal record to even suggest invoking this clause was a 1949 State Department telegram referring to possible remedies for trade discrimination, which was never acted upon.(11)
The original clause allows the president to impose duties of up to 50% against a country that: [1] Imposes “any unreasonable charge, exaction, regulation, or limitation which is not equally enforced upon the like articles of every foreign country” or [2] “Discriminates in fact against the commerce of the United States” with tariff or non-tariff barriers that “place the commerce of the United States at a disadvantage compared with the commerce of any foreign country.”(12)
The pursuit of dollar-for-dollar retaliation inadvertently strengthens Trump’s hand in defending these measures from a likely court challenge.
After the U.S. joined the GATT agreement in 1947, Congress adopted a string of new trade laws that further defined and restricted the retaliatory authorities it granted to the president. In 1962, Congress passed the Trade Expansion Act, which clarified the meaning of “discriminatory” acts, or those that “oppress the commerce” of the United States. This law was revised again into Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which prescribes a detailed investigatory process for retaliating against any foreign measure that is “unreasonable or discriminatory” and that “burdens or restricts United States commerce.”(13)
Thereafter, Section 301 became the default tool by which presidents could impose retaliatory tariffs following a formal investigatory finding, and was the basis for most U.S. tariff measures enacted between 1975 and 2024. Since it also introduced further specificity to the statute books, most legal experts concluded that its provisions superseded the older language, including Section 338.(14) This conclusion comes from another legal doctrine established by the Supreme Court, holding that “if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act.”(15)
A legal challenge to the Section 338 tariffs against Canada will likely rest on two arguments. The first notes that this 1930 provision has been superseded by later statutes, meaning it is no longer available for a president to use on a whim. It follows from this reasoning that Trump’s attempted resuscitation of Section 338 is meant to circumvent the more recent and more restrictive investigatory requirements for enacting tariffs under Section 301. If so, this interpretation of Section 338 is illegal.
Trump ordered U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer to pursue a tactic known as “statute shopping.”
A second potential argument rests upon whether “discrimination” against U.S. commerce by Canada—the trigger condition for the original 1930 statute, and the investigatory condition contemplated in the later 1974 statute—truly exists. This is where the Carney government’s dollar-for-dollar retaliatory measures could inadvertently undermine the case against this newest round of tariffs.
Prior to 2025, the United States and Canada enjoyed one of the least restrictive trade relationships on the planet. Past agreements under NAFTA and the USMCA (which Trump agreed to during his first term) eliminated the vast majority of tariff barriers between the two nations.(16) The main exception involves a provision under the USMCA that permitted prohibitive tariffs of from 240% to 300% on U.S. dairy exports to Canada in excess of predetermined quotas.(17) In practice, these quotas were rarely exceeded, as almost all US dairy products entered Canada without triggering these extreme rates.(18) The Trump administration has nonetheless seized upon this provision as a pretext for claims of “discrimination” in its attempt to revive Section 338.
Taken alone, the U.S. response is vastly disproportionate to these seldom-triggered dairy clauses. With dollar-for-dollar retaliation, though, the Canadian government may inadvertently supply Trump with the evidence he needs to show pervasive Canadian “discrimination” against U.S. commerce. The case against Trump’s use of Section 338 thereby loses one of its strongest arguments, namely that its trigger conditions had not been met.
The Politics of the US Tariff Situation
Compared to President Trump’s attempts to impose new tariffs by executive order, legal challenges within the U.S. move slowly and methodically through the court system. As the invalidation of his last round of tariffs shows, though, the American judicial system has run out of patience with these novel legal arguments. Indeed, two other “statute shopping” replacement tariffs—one under a separate misapplication of Section 301 and one through a different dormant clause, Section 122—are currently making their way through the American judicial system.(19)
The White House faces strong political backlash against tariffs in the United States, where they remain deeply unpopular. According to recent survey data, 58% of Americans oppose the new Section 338 tariffs on Canada compared to just 26% in favour. Similar proportions of Americans also reject White House claims that Canada treats the United States unfairly, and an astounding 68% of Americans report that the president’s broader tariff agenda is harmful to the U.S. economy.(20) Opinion surveys may seem like small consolation given the tangible economic harms of a trade war, but they illustrate that most Americans currently share Canada’s frustrations with the White House’s tariff policies.
The White House faces strong political backlash against tariffs in the United States, where they remain deeply unpopular.
Retaliation may seem cathartic to Canadians, whose frustration is legitimate. But it also needlessly hands Trump a basis to defend his “statute shopping” tactics in court. And it risks undermining the American public’s strong opposition to tariffs on Canadian goods. Given these considerations, the most prudential course of action for Canada is to deprive Donald Trump of ammunition as he pursues an illegal and unpopular trade war.
References
- SCOTUSblog, “Trump v. V.O.S. Selections (25-250),” consulted September 25, 2026.
- Donald J. Trump, Imposing Additional Duties to Offset Canadian Discrimination Against the Commerce of the United States with Respect to Alcoholic Beverages, The White House, proclamation, July 20, 2026.
- Abby Hughes, “U.S. bans on Canadian booze hit producers on one of trade war’s thorniest fronts,” CBC News, September 29, 2026.
- Mark Carney, Prime Minister Carney delivers remarks on Canada-U.S. trade negotiations, Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, speech, August 22, 2026.
- Sean Boynton, “Strong support for Canada axing U.S. trade talks, retaliatory tariffs: poll,” Global News, August 29, 2026.
- Abba P. Lerner, “The Symmetry between Import and Export Taxes,” Economica, Vol. 3, No. 11, August 1936, pp. 306-313.
- Donald J. Trump, post on Truth Social (@realDonaldTrump), August 24, 2026.
- Daniel Dale, “Fact check: Trump keeps making stuff up about Canada,” CNN, August 25, 2026.
- Donald J. Trump, op. cit., footnote 7.
- J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
- “The Secretary of State to the Consul at Shanghai (McConaughy),” August 12, 1949, telegram 560.AL/8-1249, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China, Volume IX, document 901, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, p. 961.
- Tariff Act of 1930, § 338, “Discrimination by foreign countries,” 19 U.S.C. § 1338, Office of the Law Revision Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives.
- Trade Act of 1974, § 301, “Actions by United States Trade Representative,” 19 U.S.C. § 2411, Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School, consulted September 25, 2026.
- Eugene Volokh, “Does the Smoot-Hawley Act Justify the Trump Tariffs? No, Says Philip Zelikow,” Reason, The Volokh Conspiracy, June 3, 2025.
- Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497 (1936).
- Karicia Quiroz, “Canada’s ‘tariff-free’ exports to the U.S.: What the numbers really show,” Export Development Canada, January 12, 2026.
- Canada Border Services Agency, Customs Tariff — Schedule, Departmental Consolidation of the Customs Tariff (T2025), January 1, 2025.
- Ben Cohen, “Trump’s Misleading Claim on Canadian Dairy Tariffs,” FactCheck.org, Annenberg Public Policy Center, April 1st, 2025.
- Liberty Justice Center, “Liberty Justice Center Challenges Unlawful Section 301 Tariffs as Administration Replaces Expiring Section 122 Tariffs,” July 24, 2026; Liberty Justice Center, “Burlap and Barrel, Inc. and Basic Fun, Inc. v. Trump,” U.S. Court of International Trade, filed March 9, 2026.
- YouGov, The Economist/YouGov Poll, survey of 1,592 U.S. adult citizens, August 28-31, 2026, p. 14.